Moderation and Immoderation among Islamic Political Parties

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Abstract: Under what conditions do anti-system political parties moderate? Under what conditions do moderate parties revert to immoderate behavior? While in recent decades scholars of Islam and politics have explained the sources of moderation and immoderation, there are major gaps in our knowledge; existing research is almost entirely qualitative, focused at change over time, national level, and examines moderation or immoderation rather than both processes. Using a novel approach, we coded the appeals from election posters of over 750 Indonesian candidates from Islamic political parties in order to map the conditions under which they make moderate or immoderate appeals. We find that party ideology, demographics, urban/rural differences, and level of government drive candidate behavior. This finding demonstrates the conditions that drive moderation and immoderation, and suggests a new data source and new opportunities for studying the conditions under which anti-system parties will challenge democratic values or help to make democracy work.

Keywords: Islam, political parties, democracy, moderation

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Introduction

Islamist parties—or political parties that find a blueprint for social, moral, political, and economic reform in the teachings of the Islamic faith—are a structural feature of politics across the Muslim world (Schwedler 2011; Kendhammer 2016). These parties call on the state to implement and enforce Islamic law, especially on issues related to media, the family, proselytizing, and apostasy. They are a remarkably durable feature of modern Muslim politics, and their influence and persistence have raised important questions for scholars of Islam, political parties, and democracy.

Are Islamist parties compatible with democratic institutions? The standard concern encapsulated in the phrase "one man, one vote, one time" is that if an Islamist party wins a democratic election, there is no certainty that it will agree to electoral competition in the future (Blaydes and Lo 2011). Indeed, Islamist parties have gained power through elections and then led efforts to stifle pluralism and democratic liberties in what were previously the most democratic states of the Middle East. Turkey's Justice and Development Party (AKP) has become "immoderate" since 2011, guiding the country's move into authoritarianism (Kirdiş 2018). After taking power in 2012, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) was remarkably exclusionary, contributing to the closing of the country's nascent democratic opening (Pahwa 2017). Islamists are not the sole cause of the collapse of democracy in Turkey and Egypt, but they certainly share in the responsibility.

Scholars have devoted decades of research to mapping the conditions of Islamist moderation. Samuel Huntington in *The Third Wave* (1968) proposed inclusion-moderation theory, or the idea that democratizing states can deradicalize anti-system parties, such as socialists, by incorporating them into the new political order. In the third wave, as in the first,

moderation was the price of power that allowed socialist and other working-class parties to advance their interests while contributing to democratic stability. Like socialists, anti-liberal Catholics, communists, Hindu nationalists, and Islamists have also moderated their views to gain political power. Over time, some Islamists have become "Muslim democrats" in a similar manner to how Christian Democrats emerged in Europe (Nasr 2005; Driessen 2018; Kalyvas 1996, 2000; Clark 2006; Schwedler 2006, 2011; Buehler 2013; Clark 2006; Somer 2012; Gurses 2014; Yildirim 2016).

However, prominent Islamists in Egypt, Turkey, and Morocco have moved in the opposite direction (Kirdiş 2018). As a result, change away from moderation, or "immoderation," is now receiving overdue attention, thereby normalizing a literature that has previously focused only on change in one direction.

Under what conditions will candidates become more immoderate (Kirdiş 2018; Bashirov and Lancaster 2018; Pahwa 2017)? Under what conditions will Muslim democrats revert to anti-system behavior? This article builds on recent research on the inclusion and moderation of Islamic parties to explain the conditions under which Islamists make moderate appeals, as well as those under which moderate Muslim democratic parties make immoderate appeals. We demonstrate four determinants of candidate behavior.

First, as the literature suggests, party ideology is a good predictor of candidate behavior. Muslim democrats are indeed substantively different from Islamists, even though some scholars continue to conflate the two groups (Hamid 2016). Our findings indicate that Muslim democrats make more moderate appeals whereas Islamists make more immoderate appeals.

Second, the religious demographics of an electoral district are a reliable determinant of candidate behavior. Candidates make the most moderate appeals in highly heterogeneous

districts where they recognize that, to win election, they need substantial non-Muslim support. Conversely, they make more immoderate appeals in more homogenously Muslim districts.

Third, contrary to the predictions of modernization theory, candidates are more likely to make moderate appeals in rural than in urban areas. In this respect, our research supports the view of immoderate Islamists as a modern social movement rather than a relic of traditional values (Brooke and Ketchley 2018).

Fourth and finally, candidates are more moderate at the national level than at the provincial or local level. This is a function of political strategy. In democratic Indonesia, Islamists have failed in efforts to implement Islamic law at the national level but have had more success at the district level. Islamists have learned from these successes and are more likely to make moderate appeals at higher than at lower levels.

These findings make four substantial contributions to scholarship on Islam and politics. First, we explain variation in the moderation of Islamists across space, not simply over time. Second, because most of the literature is qualitative and relies on national political parties, there have not been sufficient data points to study *both* moderation and immoderation; we provide a framework to do so. Third, we map variation in Islamist moderation at the district level, which provides a tremendous opportunity since far more data points are available at the district and provincial levels than at the national level.

Fourth, we draw on an original unique dataset of over 750 election posters from 570 candidates, which we coded so as to identify their moderate and immoderate appeals. This is the largest known collection of campaign material from Islamist and Muslim democratic parties ever used to explain variation in moderation in real time. This analysis is also one of a small number

of quantitative tests amidst a predominantly qualitative literature (Driessen 2018; Kurzman and Türkoğlu 2015; Kurzman and Naqvi 2010).

In the next section, we review the relevant literature and then propose a general theory on the conditions for moderation and immoderation. After that, we introduce the case of Indonesia, the world's largest Muslim-majority country and a consolidated democracy that is home to multiple Islamist and Muslim democratic parties. Since Indonesian elections occur at the national, provincial, and district levels, we can also examine party behavior at the subnational level. The section on methods and data introduces our novel data source—election posters—and explains how they are harnessed for statistical analysis. The findings section presents our results, and our conclusions suggest next steps for research on Islam, political parties, and democracy.

Theories of Moderation and Immoderation

Political moderation contains two components. Radical actors may engage in *behavioral* moderation by participating in the established political system, abandoning their revolutionary goals and playing by the rules. This strategy may be accompanied by *ideological* moderation as formerly anti-system actors move "from a relatively closed and rigid worldview to one more open and tolerant of alternative perspectives" (Schwedler 2011, 359; see also Schwedler 2006, 3).

However, behavioral and ideological moderation do not always happen together. In her study of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood's Islamic Action Front (IAF), Janine Astrid Clark found that Islamists moderated their behavior by cooperating with other parties. But that moderation was limited to issues of shared interest, whereas no moderation occurred on issues that were "fully addressed" by the shari'a (Clark 2006, 540). Because of such instances, as well as for methodological clarity, scholars have increasingly distinguished behavioral from

ideological moderation. The latter is exceptionally difficult to assess in closed political systems, whereas behavioral moderation can be studied through a multiplicity of research methods. Accordingly, this paper focuses exclusively on behavioral moderation.

The moderation of Islamists is especially important in the contemporary world. Many have questioned whether Islam is compatible with democracy, but survey research has consistently demonstrated high levels of support for democracy among Muslim peoples (Hefner 2000; Hoffman and Jamal 2014; Kendhammer 2016). Most pious Muslim voters support a democratic, pluralist political system in which Islam still plays some role (Nasr 2005; Driessen 2018). These moderate Muslim democrats are contrasted with Islamists, who seek to impose a particularistic cultural vision on society through state control of the media, religious education, and the public sphere.

Muslim democratic parties are generally considered compatible with democracy; Islamist parties are more problematic (Achilov and Sen 2017; Driessen 2018). Islamists have narrow and closed interpretations of shari'a, and they oppose civil liberties, cultural pluralism, women's and minority rights, and democracy itself. Although forms of Islamism range broadly from militants such as the Taliban to conservative political parties like the IAF, all Islamists desire to establish the Islamic faith as the blueprint for society and reject liberal, feminist, or other alternative approaches to sacred texts.

What drives Islamists to moderate? In the 2000s, scholars of political Islam argued that Islamists' inclusion in democratic politics would foster their moderation. Carrie Rosefsky Wickham's early article on the Egyptian Wasat party charted the emergence of a splinter faction from the Muslim Brotherhood that endorsed pluralism, equal rights, and popular sovereignty (Wickham 2004, 207). Mehmet Gurses showed that Islamists in Turkey developed positive

attitudes toward electoral democracy to the extent that they were allowed to share power (Gurses 2014). Although their stance was more pragmatic than principled, they undoubtedly moderated. Murat Somer's research on Turkish Islamists demonstrated that they moderated in the direction of the country's political center, which entailed not only democratic but authoritarian attributes. Somer (2012) found that Islamists did not travel a predictable linear progression from radicalism to liberalism but, rather, evolved in ways that were specific to the country, multidimensional, and— unfortunately—reversible.

Somer's pessimism was justified. Over the past ten years, scholars have increasingly noted instances of the immoderation of Islamists, along with unintended consequences of Islamist moderation. In Morocco, the Party of Justice and Development has moderated, yet political liberalization has been reversed as a result of the regime's fear of the Islamist opposition. Paradoxically, the moderation of this Islamist opposition party has closed off opportunities for democratization (Wegner and Pellicer 2009). In Turkey, the AKP has radicalized as a result of the waning possibility of EU accession and the weakening of the opposition parties and the judiciary (Bashirov and Lancaster 2018). Moreover, elections have served as a radicalizing rather than a moderating force (Jaffrelot 2012). And there are also very real constraints on moderation. After the Arab Spring, the success of far-right Salafists in Egypt constrained the FJP's ability to move toward the political center (Volpi and Stein 2015; Pahwa 2017). Sumita Pahwa (2017, 1074) described the FJP's vacillation, concluding that Islamists are forced to balance multiple electoral and constitutional priorities. Recognition of the multiple possible pathways for Islamic political parties suggests that an interpretation of political Islam must take into account significant variations in moderation and immoderation.

Existing literature seeking to explain moderation and immoderation has focused primarily on two factors: iterated elections and internal party structure. One common argument is that a series of elections over time will propel Islamist parties to moderate their behavior and move toward the center (Downs 1957; Ghobashy 2005; Somer 2012). Although voters care about identity issues like the application of shari'a, they also care about material issues such as infrastructure, healthcare, taxes, and corruption. Across multiple elections, Islamists unable to deliver these more banal goods are likely to lose vote share. In contrast, Islamists who moderate, appealing to voters' diverse preferences, can attract electoral support (Menchik 2018). Similarly, the stability of the electoral rules over time fosters moderation, whereas instability in electoral rules and regime behavior encourages Islamists not to moderate and risk alienating their base (Schwedler 2013; Volpi and Stein 2015; Pahwa 2017).

Islamic parties that foster a space for internal debate and pluralism have the capacity to moderate in response to electoral failure and voter preferences (Wickham 2004; Schwedler 2006). Over time, democratic learning can occur within these parties. In Egypt, members of the Muslim Brotherhood moved toward moderation as they interacted with more secular political activists (Wickham 2004). In contrast, Islamic organizations with more rigid internal party structures—particularly when they place restrictions on dissent, prohibiting the circulation of and purging alternative views—will exhibit more immoderate behavior (Kirdiş 2018, 903).

Other scholars have looked more specifically at another key aspect of internal party structure—namely, party leadership. Edward Aspinall explains the transformation of the Islamist Darul Islam rebellion in Indonesia into a secular, ethnically Acehnese movement on the basis of the change in movement leadership from ethnic chiefs (*uleebalang*) to the Islamic ulama and then to more secular Acehnese nationalists (Aspinall 2007). Similarly, Quinn Mecham

demonstrates that Islamist parties in Turkey moderated their platforms to work strategically within a political system characterized by rewards for political entrepreneurship, the presence of institutional constraints, and incentives that encouraged the movement to provide signals about its intentions (Mecham 2004). Finally, Islamist parties often have both political and social wings. On some occasions the social movement opposes moderation, thereby constraining the political wing's ability to moderate (Volpi and Stein 2015; Arifianto 2018).

Despite this accumulation of knowledge, the literature on why Islamic parties engage in moderate behavior suffers from three severe limitations. First, it focuses on how Islamic parties may or may not moderate *over time*. This approach treats Islamic parties as homogeneous in a single election, both vertically and horizontally. In reality, the extent of moderation at any single point in time can vary by district. For example, depending on the audience, an Islamic party's candidate may make more or less moderate appeals in an effort to gain support.

Second, with a single exception (Buehler 2013), all prior research has occurred at the national level, despite the fact that Islamic parties also compete for power at the district and provincial levels. In the present study, we explain variation in Islamist moderation at the district level. By doing so, we contribute not only to the literature on political party moderation, but also to scholarship on subnational authoritarianism and democracy (Gibson 2005; Sidel 2014). This approach to the study of Islamic party behavior can also achieve greater reliability, since far more data points are available at the district and provincial levels than at the national level.

Third, the literature often fails to make a distinction between parties that vary in terms of their commitment to Islam, their guiding philosophy, or their ideological basis, such as between Islamists and Muslim democratic parties. Because Islamic parties have been disconnected from

the larger literature on political party behavior, scholars have only begun to map how they may shift in directions other than toward moderation.

Fourth, a number of factors, other than repeated elections and internal party structures, that might affect moderation have remained unexplored. In the next section, we discuss these factors and their potential impact on candidates' inclination to moderate their behavior.

Why Islamic Party Candidates Engage in Moderate Behavior

To explain why candidates engage in moderation or immoderation, our argument focuses on the pressures they face. First, candidates are influenced from above (i.e., by their party), and in particular by the ideological nature of their party. Candidates often have strong incentives to emphasize a close connection with their political party's performance, leadership, and ideological underpinnings, because many voters want to hear about or may feel a sense of allegiance to the candidate's party. In addition, party leaders are more likely to reward loyalist candidates who toe the party line. This tendency especially prevails under party-centric electoral rules (Carey and Shugart 1995; Fox 2018a). Therefore, the ideological nature of parties—and specifically the ideological distinction between Islamist and Muslim democratic parties—matters greatly. Islamists' ideology is rooted in a narrower, more closed interpretation of Islam (Achilov and Sen 2017; Driessen 2018). As a result of the ideological differences between parties, we expect Islamist candidates to make more immoderate appeals than Muslim democrats when appealing for votes.

Candidates also need to consider pressures from below—specifically, the different kinds of constituencies they are appealing to. In this paper we examine three forms of variation among constituencies: the size of the Muslim population, whether the electorate is urban or rural, and whether the candidate is appealing to a smaller (regional) or broader (national) electorate.

Figure 1 summarizes the pressures that candidates face from above and below and their expected impact on candidate moderation and immoderation.

The literature regarding the impact of demography on the behavior of political elites and voters has been growing in recent years (e.g., Kasara 2013; Tajima et al. 2018). Research has found that during electoral competition, candidates tend to mobilize ethnic and religious groups when such groups are large enough to form viable political coalitions (Horowitz 1985; Posner 2004, 2005; Huber 2017). It thus follows that candidates will modify their behavior depending on the size of the Muslim population in their electoral district.

When the Muslim population is a minority, we expect Islamic party candidates to moderate their behavior in an effort to increase their vote share. Most Muslims in Indonesia vote for nationalist rather than Islamic parties; for them, the Islamic party label is not a strong motivating factor (Pepinsky, Liddle, and Mujani 2018). By moderating their appeals in religiously diverse districts, Islamic party candidates can, to some degree, remove Islam as a stumbling block for Muslim voters, and maybe even for some non-Muslims who may find their anti-corruption commitments or other policies appealing (Pepinsky, Liddle, and Mujani 2018, 80). This dynamic becomes especially critical when the Muslim population is small.

As the size of the Muslim population grows, so too does the proportion of voters who might be attracted to Islamic appeals and party labels. Hence, the presence of a larger Muslim constituency should tend to encourage more immoderation in candidates' behavior and campaign advertising.

As for the issue of rural versus urban constituencies, modernization theorists such as Ernest Gellner (1983) posited that with the shift from a traditional agrarian to an industrial society, long-established indigenous, religious, and linguistic identities would fade and be

replaced by class, occupational, and national identities. In more recent work on religious politics, Norris and Inglehart (2011) offered similar insights when comparing rural agricultural employees and urban workers. They found that urban Muslim workers were better educated and also more tolerant, due to their contact with non-Muslims and secular Muslims as well as their experiences of higher education and the manufacturing sector. Given these cultural differences, we can expect candidates to engage in more moderate behavior in urban than in rural areas.

However, two strands of research predict that modernization will have the opposite impact. In the ethnic politics literature, several scholars have shown that modernization actually strengthens and politicizes ethnic and religious identities (e.g., Eifert et al. 2010). They claim that urbanization and industrialization entail more competition for jobs. As a result, workers and elites in urban settings are motivated to exploit their ethnic and religious group membership to attain economic resources and political power. Another set of studies, on the recent revival of Islamic politics, expresses similar expectations. It suggests that the political revival of Islam is not a function of traditional residues revered in rural hinterlands, but a twentieth-century social movement that has emerged in modern urban sectors (Brooke and Ketchley 2018). This literature contends that the urban middle class is more likely than rural agricultural workers to support Islamist politicians. Overall, the evidence seems to support this view that urban voters will be more receptive to immoderate candidates. As a result, we expect candidates to engage in more immoderate behavior in urban than in rural districts.

Finally, we investigate whether the degree of moderation will vary depending on whether the candidate is competing for a seat in a regional or national legislature. Since democratization, Islamists have made limited legislative inroads at the national level but have achieved greater success in local campaigns. Many localities have seen a proliferation of local Shari'a laws

(Buehler 2016), Islamic issues have motivated mass protests in local elections, and Islamic vigilantes have often acted with impunity in their persecution of minority groups. These factors suggest that candidates campaigning for a regional legislative seat will tend to engage in more immoderate behavior than those who are running for the national legislature and thus need to appeal to a broader constituency.

Of course, the pressures we have outlined here are not unique to Islamist or Muslim democratic candidates. Indeed, the predictions detailed above are largely drawn from the ethnic politics literature, which focuses more on variation across space than on change over time. All candidates, to varying degrees, must consider internal party dynamics, party ideology, and their constituency's needs when developing a campaign strategy. Our objective here is to theorize specifically how these factors will affect candidates from Islamic parties. In addition, the four types of pressures outlined are not meant to be exhaustive; other factors can affect moderation.

Indonesia and Islam

Indonesia provides an ideal field site for testing theories regarding the moderation and immoderation of Islamic political parties. It is the world's largest Muslim-majority country and a consolidated democracy. Importantly, Indonesia has a large number of candidates from parties with nationalist, Muslim democratic, and Islamist ideological underpinnings, and the divisions between these ideologies are salient among voters and elites. In addition, candidates compete for national and regional legislative seats in electoral districts that vary considerably in terms of the size of the Muslim population and their urban or rural nature. This variation in party ideology, level of electoral completion, demographics, and urbanization allows us to test our hypotheses on what drives moderation and immoderation.

Research on Islamists in Indonesia suggests that over time, Islamic political parties that have participated in politics have moderated their views. Their ideologies have shifted from pan-Islamist to Indonesian Islamist, or from Indonesian Islamist to Muslim democratic (Menchik 2018). Likewise, the leading contemporary Islamist party, the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), has moderated at both the national and local levels (Buehler 2012). Nevertheless, there is also evidence of the limits of moderation and the pull of immoderate policies. Alex Arifianto (2018) has noted the lack of moderation among Islamist social movements, which face very different incentives from those of political parties. As in Egypt, the presence of radical flanks may incentivize political parties to take immoderate positions (Pahwa 2017).

The data for this paper come from the 2009 Indonesian elections and encompass all eleven Islamic parties. There were five national Islamist parties, three regional Islamist parties, and three Muslim democratic parties (Baswedan 2004; Buehler 2012, 2016). A brief discussion of these parties and their categorization Islamist or Muslim democratic follows.

The five Islamist parties were the United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, PPP), the Reform Star Party (Partai Bintang Reformasi, PBR), the Moon and Star Party (Partai Bulan Bintang, PBB), the Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS), and the Indonesian Nahdlatul Community Party (Partai Persatuan Nahdlatul Ummah Indonesia, PPNUI). PPP is the oldest Islamist party in Indonesia, having been founded in 1973 when the dictator Suharto forced all Islamic parties to merge. Since democratization it has continued to call for state application of Islamic law. PBR is a splinter group from PPP that met the 2% legislative threshold in the 2004 elections but not in 2009; it has since been absorbed into strongman Prabowo Subianto's party. Another older Islamist party is PBB, founded in 1998, which like PPP claims to have inherited the legacy of past generations of Islamists, specifically

the 1950s party Masyumi. PKS was also created in 1998 as the political vehicle of a campus proselytizing network modeled after the cadre-based Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood.[1] PKS's cadre system means that it is less personalist than the other parties and more disciplined (Buehler 2012). Finally, PPNUI was founded in 1998 by a group of Islamist anti-Shia activists associated with the country's largest Islamic organization, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU).

Aceh is the only province that permits regional parties; this allowance was part of the 2005 peace accord that ended Aceh's secessionist war.[2] Although numerous regional Acehnese parties formed, the three Islamic ones that competed in the 2009 election were the Prosperous and Safe Aceh Party (Partai Aceh Aman Sejahtera, PAAS), the United Aceh Party (Partai Bersatu Aceh, PBA), and the Aceh Sovereignty Party (Partai Damai Aceh, PDA). PAAS represented many of Aceh's religious clerics, PBA was founded by a former activist in Muhammadiyah (the country's second-largest Islamic civil society organization), and PDA was the main vehicle for Acehnese Islamic school clerics who were not affiliated with Aceh's secessionist movement (Barter 2011).

We also include the three Muslim democratic parties that competed in the 2009 election: the National Mandate Party (PAN, Partai Amanat Nasional), the National Awakening Party (Patrai Kebangkitan Bangsa, PKB), and the Party of the Awakening of the Muslim Community (Partai Kebangkitan Nasional Ulama, PKNU). PAN was founded in 1998 by the former chairman of Muhammadiyah, Amien Rais; it remains closely associated with Muhammadiyah and was considered a moderate Islamic party in 2009 (Baswedan 2004, 686). PKB was founded in 1998 by Abdurrahman Wahid, the former president and chairman of NU, and draws its leadership from the older generation of NU activists, who were prominent in politics from the

1950s through 1970s when NU was a party. PKNU was founded in 2006 by a splinter group from PKB and, like PBR, failed to meet the 2% threshold in the 2009 legislative election.

Beyond political parties, Indonesia also has significant variation in terms of the constituencies to which candidates appeal. First, although most electoral districts have a Muslim majority, many others are quite mixed or have Christian or Hindu majorities. Thus, there is significant variation by district in the size of the Muslim population.[3] Second, Indonesia is a vast country with hundreds of electoral districts, varying from densely populated cities with thriving urban sectors to far more sparsely populated rural districts that rely on farming and fishing. Since modernization theorists argue that urban voters will be more moderate than rural voters, Indonesia provides a good field site for assessing whether candidates for office behave differently between urban and rural areas. Third, Indonesian candidates compete for national legislative seats in large electoral districts, whereas regional legislative districts are much smaller, at both the provincial and sub-provincial levels. So candidate appeals may be affected by either national or local agendas.

Importantly, candidates in the 2009 election needed to connect personally with their constituencies, because voters cast ballots for candidates, not parties. Using an open-list proportional representation system, party seats were then awarded to candidates who won the most votes in each electoral district. As a result, candidates had incentives to tailor campaigns to their constituencies so as to maximize their number of votes.

Measuring Moderation and Immoderation with Election Posters

Existing studies of party moderation have been overwhelmingly qualitative. However, various types of data can be used to study individual candidate campaign behavior. They include candidates' websites and social media presence, their television advertisements and speeches,

and coverage of individual candidates in newspaper reports. Unfortunately, these data sources

would likely result in a skewed sample with more information on the major candidates who have

ample resources and minimal information on the minor candidates.

However, campaign posters are a promising type of data because they are inexpensive, low-tech, and used by virtually all candidates regardless of their budget. Election posters represent the most prominent form of campaign advertising in Indonesia and many other countries. They are usually large and colorful, featuring a main image of a candidate dressed in a suit or in Islamic or indigenous clothing, and packed with emotive messages, symbols, and images. Posters can have a significant impact on campaigns; the relatively few recent studies of election posters have shown that they can affect voting behavior by raising name recognition, signaling competitiveness, and increasing participation (Panagopoulos 2009; Kam and Zechmeister 2013; Dumitrescu 2012). Posters can also help us understand the factors that influence local and national campaign strategies (Fox 2018b). In fact, in Indonesia, many voters consider the influence of election posters (coupled with brochures) equal to or greater than that of television, newspapers, radio, or vote buying (Hill 2009). By engaging in a content analysis of posters' textual and visual content, we can assess the degree to which some candidates make moderate appeals while others make more immoderate appeals.

Photographs of election posters were gathered during the 2009 national, provincial, and district legislative election campaigns. Four weeks before the elections, we emailed a network of researchers located across Indonesia, asking them to take photos of election posters in the areas where they lived.[4] These poster photos were gathered and stored in a database for analysis. This paper analyzes the 756 uniquely designed posters that promoted Islamic and Muslim democratic candidates.

Although the regions, neighborhoods, or streets from which the posters came were not randomly preselected,[5] we do not believe that the regions where posters were photographed or the way in which researchers located them produced any kind of systematic bias. First, a large

number of posters was gathered, from 570 candidates in 13 of Indonesia's 33 provinces, because our research assistants were dispersed throughout the country. Second, there is no reason to believe that these researchers were cherrypicking particular types of election posters. The researchers were asked to photograph any and all posters in their area, and we encouraged them to photograph as many as possible by paying a small fee for each unique poster. We gave our research assistants no indication that the study concerned identity politics.

Third, posters were gathered from numerous electoral districts. Our dataset encompasses posters from candidates in 65 electoral districts—18 for the national legislature, 25 for the provincial legislatures, and 22 for the district (*Kabupaten/Kota*) legislatures. Finally, the sample of posters covers all eleven Islamic parties that competed in the 2009 election. The numbers of posters and candidates for each party were also proportional to party size, with PAN, PKS and PPP taking up larger proportions. Ultimately, we have no reason to believe that the posters photographed were systematically different from those not photographed.

Dependent Variables: Moderation and Immoderation

To analyze the appeals, each poster was coded for its index information, type of candidate clothing, background imagery, and text messages. For the purpose of the present study, the main dependent variable was the type of appeal—either nationalist (reflecting moderation) or Islamic (immoderation). Posters were coded for nationalist imagery if they displayed national symbols such as the Indonesian flag or map, contained endorsements from nationalist associations or elites, or used particular words related to nationalism.[6] A poster was described as having a nationalist appeal if it contained one or more of these elements that invoked nationalism.

Posters were coded as Islamic based on various elements. The images of candidates in posters could be coded for the presence of Islamic clothing, headdress, or cloth (e.g., the turban

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cloth, *sorban,* held on the arm or around the neck). They could also be coded for Islamic imagery if they identified local Muslim leaders, displayed images of Islamic rituals, or included easily recognizable images such as a mosque. Finally, they could be coded for Islamic text if they used Arabic writing or words relating to Islam. Each poster was then labeled as either having an Islamic appeal or not. A poster was classified as having an Islamic appeal if it contained one or more elements that invoked Islam (i.e. clothing, imagery, text) but no other religious groups. In that sense, the poster was exclusively appealing to Islam above other religions. Importantly, nationalist and Islamic appeals were not mutually exclusive; candidates could, and often did, mix both Islamic and nationalist imagery in their posters.

The dataset contains multiple poster designs from some candidates. Because the argument relates to candidates' campaigns rather than specific poster designs, it was more appropriate to use the candidate as the unit of analysis and aggregate each individual candidate's posters. To do so, we calculated the proportion of a candidate's posters that contained a nationalist appeal, from 0 to 1. (For simplicity, we refer to this measure as *nationalist appeals*.) In effect, this is a measure of moderation. The same logic was applied to candidate posters with Islamic appeals; this measure of immoderation also ranged from 0 to 1.

Covariates and Model

To test the impact of being from an Islamic or Muslim democrat party on moderation and immoderation, we created a variable, *Islamist party*, that took the value of 1 if the candidate was from any party that overtly self-identified as Islamist and was guided by Islamic ideology. As explained above, there were eight such parties (national parties PPNUI, PBB, PBR, PKS, and PPP, and Acehnese parties PAAS, PBA, and PDA). This variable was set at 0 for candidates in the Muslim democratic parties, namely PAN, PKB, and PKNU. Although Islam is an important

source of inspiration for these parties, they draw on the national ideology of Pancasila (i.e., embracing diversity). Half the candidates in the dataset were coded as Islamist party candidates; the other half were Muslim democrats.

To test the impact of different types of constituencies, we gathered data on the three key variables. First, the percentage of the Muslim population in each candidate's electoral district was taken from the 2010 national census. Since Indonesia is 88% Muslim, most electoral districts in Indonesia have Muslim majorities. These national demographics are reflected in our sample, with 508 candidates (89%) competing in Muslim-majority districts and 62 candidates (11%) in Muslim-minority districts. Second, as a measure of urbanization, we used the percentage of gross regional domestic product (GRDP) that comes from the modernized (i.e., non-agricultural) sector within the candidate's electoral district. This was calculated by subtracting the farming and fishing GRDP from the total GRDP. Electoral districts could encompass strictly urban areas, rural areas, or a combination of both. The percentage of GRDP coming from the modern sector ranged from 44% to 100%.[7] Third, we created a binary variable equal to 1 if the candidate was competing for a seat in a regional legislature—provincial (DPRD *Propinsi*) or district (DPRD *Kabupaten/Kota*)—or 0 if running for the national legislature (DPD-RI). There are far more seats in the regional legislatures, so most posters (77%) were for regional legislative candidates.

Finally, we included two controls. We coded the candidate's gender (1 = female, 0 = male). Because an Islamic headscarf (*jilbab*) was coded as an Islamic appeal but can often be worn as a social convention rather than as an expression of commitment to Islam, we needed to control for the dominance of Islamic appeals in female candidates' posters. Altogether, 124

candidates (22%) with posters in the sample were female. Finally, we also included the natural log of the population (*population (log)*).

For the statistical analysis, we constructed a linear probability model (OLS) with robust standard errors on the two continuous dependent variables, moderation and immoderation. One potential issue with the data was that we often had just one or two posters for each candidate. As a result, many candidates had a score of 0 or 1 on this variable, creating a non-normal distribution. As a robustness check, we dichotomized the dependent variables and used a logit model. Next, we considered the limited nature of the dependent variable using a Tobit model with a floor of 0 and a ceiling of 1. Finally, we changed the unit of analysis to the poster (rather than the candidate's entire poster campaign). The alternative model results (presented in the appendix) were consistent with the OLS statistical findings presented below.

Findings

Table 1 presents the statistical findings on the impact of the key variables on moderation (nationalist appeals) and immoderation (Islamic appeals). Regressions were run using all candidates, as well as with subsets of Muslim democratic and Islamist candidates. Each model contains all key independent variables and the controls.

<u>Moderation and immoderation pressures from above: the political party</u>

In line with expectations, party ideology mattered with regard to candidates' campaign behavior. The regression analysis indicates that compared to Muslim democrats, Islamists used fewer nationalist appeals (moderation) and more Islamic appeals (immoderation) in their campaigns. To visualize the impact of party ideology on candidates' moderate and immoderate behavior, the predictive margins are presented in **Figure 2**. The bars show the predicted percentage of a candidate's poster campaign that contained nationalist and Islamic appeals. They

indicate that nationalist appeals were 6% more frequent among Muslim democrats, whereas Islamic appeals were 11% more common among Islamists.

Although the differences in moderation and immoderation between Muslim democrats and Islamists are what we expected, there was some variation across parties. To take a closer look, we placed each political party along axes for moderation and immoderation. In **Figure 3**, the vertical axis measures moderation (nationalist appeals) and the horizontal axis measures immoderation (Islamic appeals). Each circle represents a political party, and the size of the circle denotes the percentage of votes for that party in the 2009 national legislative elections. Muslim democratic parties are shown in gray, national Islamist parties in white, and regional Islamist parties in black.

The chart shows a notable split between most of the Muslim democratic parties and the Islamist parties. PAN and PKB candidates had relatively high level of nationalist appeals and low levels of Islamist appeals. Meanwhile, the Islamist parties PBR, PPP, and PBB and the parties from Aceh promoted Islam more and nationalism less. Muslim democrats and Islamists wore Islamic clothing and used Islamic imagery to a similar extent, but they were distinguished by their relatively greater use of Islamic textual content—both the Arabic language and Islam-related words and messages.

There are two outliers: PKNU, a Muslim democratic party, and the Islamist PKS. PKNU candidates promoted both nationalism and Islam to a large degree. Islamic appeals were more prominent in PKNU posters than in those of PAN, even though both parties were Muslim democrats with connections to Islamic organizations. The main feature setting them apart was that PKNU's posters often included images of their religious leaders whereas PAN's posters did not. In part, this contrast can be explained by differences in their Islamic organizations'

leadership. Well-known and highly respected religious clerics lead NU, and including their images on posters can effectively attract voter attention. On the other hand, lay leaders play more prominent roles in Muhammadiyah, and their images would probably garner less notice. For examples of the two parties' posters, see **Figure 4**. In the first poster, a PKNU candidate includes images of NU religious leaders and says in formal Javanese that we should all join with the Kyai (Monggo Sami Nderek Kyai). The second poster is a typical PAN poster, lacking religious leaders.

The other outlier, PKS, had the lowest level of Islamic appeals of all the Islamist parties but the highest level of nationalist appeals among *all* parties. Although PKS is Islamist, it differs from the other parties because it is based on the cadre system, like the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. Unlike the other parties, PKS has an institutionalized and rigorous recruitment system, making it a more cohesive party with higher degrees of loyalty among its cadre (Buehler 2012). This party's uniqueness among the Islamists can help to explain why its poster collection is an outlier. **Figure 4** (right) shows a typical example of a PKS poster; the candidate wears the party uniform but mixes both nationalist and Islamic imagery and messages. As the chart shows, PKS, PAN, and PKB, the parties that mixed nationalism and Islam, tended to win larger vote shares.

Finally, the Acehnese regional Islamist parties eschewed nationalism in favor of a more strictly Islamic image. They were more immoderate even than the national Islamist party candidates competing in Aceh. There is a good reason for this strategy: the Acehnese parties compete only for regional legislative seats in Aceh—a province with a large and deeply religious Muslim majority—so there is no reason to inhibit their appeals to Islam. Such immoderate behavior from regional parties should not be a surprise. In a cross-country study, Brancati (2006,

196) reported that regionally based parties had a higher tendency to reinforce regional identities, mobilize ethnic groups, and produce legislation in favor of certain ethnic groups than parties that competed nationally. Similarly, we will present evidence below that Islamic party candidates tended to be more immoderate when competing for seats in regional legislatures than when seeking national legislative office.

Moderation and immoderation pressures from below: constituencies

In addition to looking at the variations in moderation and immoderation across different types of Islamic parties, we also assessed variation across different types of constituencies by including variables for the Muslim population, GRDP from the modern economic sectors, and regional versus national legislative elections in the regression models in Table 1. To visualize the impact of constituencies on moderation and immoderation, the predictive margins are presented in **Figure 5**.

Minority and majority Muslim population constituencies

Figure 5.1 shows the predicted percentage of candidate posters containing nationalist and Islamic appeals, respectively, depending on the size of the Muslim population in the electoral district. The solid line represents all candidates, gray represents the Muslim democrats, and the dashed line represents the Islamists.

The findings reveal three important insights regarding the impact of Muslim constituencies. First and foremost, the size of the Muslim population had a statistically significant and substantial impact on appeals. In line with our expectations, as the Muslim population grew, nationalist appeals (moderation) declined while Islamic appeals (immoderation) increased. When the Muslim population was small, the percentage of candidates' posters with nationalist appeals was quite high (60%) and Islamic appeals were quite low (27%). In contrast,

in the more homogeneous Muslim districts, nationalist appeals plummeted to less than 30%
while Islamic appeals rose above 50%.

Second, there is a distinct difference in how Muslim democrats and Islamists moderate
across Muslim demographics. In Muslim-minority districts, Muslim democrats moderate
primarily by reducing Islamic appeals while Islamists primarily increase nationalist appeals. In
Table 1, the coefficients for the models with only Muslim democrats (models 2 and 5) are
statistically significant only for Islamic appeals (model 5). Likewise, models 3 and 6 for
Islamists are statistically significant only for nationalist appeals (model 3). This pattern is more
easily seen in **Figure 6**, where the bars indicate percentages of posters in districts where Muslims
are a minority or majority, respectively. This pattern suggests something "sticky" about
nationalist appeals for Muslim democrats and about Islamic appeals for Islamists. Both groups
moderate by adjusting the frequency of the identity appeals that are less central to their core
political identity.

Third, among all the candidates, 50% of campaign posters did not use Islamic appeals in
electoral districts with large Muslim populations. This finding contrasts with the impression of
stark Islamic politics that is common in election reports on Indonesia. Even for Islamic parties,
explicit visual or verbal Islamic appeals are not as common as we might have expected given the
high levels of piety among Indonesian Muslims (but see Pepinsky, Liddle, and Mujani 2018).
Although the size of the Muslim constituency had the most substantial effect on moderation,
other constituencies also had an impact.

Rural and urban constituencies

Models 1 and 4 in Table 1 indicate that as electoral districts become more urban (as
measured by greater modern-sector GRDP), nationalist appeals decline and Islamic appeals

increase. Overall, urban areas had more Islamic appeals and fewer nationalist appeals. The rural-urban distinction had a greater impact on Islamist candidates' appeals; Islamists in urban areas used only half as many nationalist appeals as those in rural areas and 10% more Islamic appeals (**Figure 6**). This is exactly the opposite of what modernization theory would predict. However, this finding should not surprise us, as there are two possible reasons for heightened Islamic appeals in urban areas.

First, as noted by scholars of ethnicity such as Bates and Posner, urban areas and their modern sectors are highly competitive places. In these places, religion becomes a useful tool by which candidates can mobilize groups and confine the expenditure of scarce resources to one group. Moreover, there is strong evidence that middle-class Indonesians in urban areas are more receptive to Islamist appeals (Meitzner and Muhtadi 2018). This is not just an Indonesian phenomenon; political Islam has taken hold in urban areas in other countries as well (Brooke and Ketchley 2018).

Regional and national constituencies

Finally, we looked at the difference between regional and national campaigns. Electoral districts for the regional legislatures are geographically smaller and less diverse; in addition, regional politicians compete for positions that are below the fray of national politics. For the most part, regional candidates are not high-profile politicians who belong to or have close connections to national party leadership. Overall, their campaigns were more regionally focused and made fewer nationalist appeals, although when we controlled for population size this difference was not statistically significant. However, regional legislative politicians did make significantly more Islamic appeals. Approximately 50% of posters from regional legislative

candidates contained Islamic appeals, compared to only 39% of posters from national legislative candidates (**Figure 6**).

Previous studies have pointed out that since Indonesia's transition to democracy, political Islam is more powerful at the local than the national level. Regulations inspired by Islamic law have proliferated among municipalities (Bush 2008; Buehler 2016). In some regions, local branches of the quasi-state Indonesian Council of Ulamas are treated like a legislative body (Ichwan 2012). Police have proved unwilling or unable to prevent majoritarian violence against small Muslim minority sects like Ahmadiyah (Menchik 2016). Candidates appear to have learned from this pattern that immoderate appeals may have traction at the local level, even while repeated attempts to pass Islamic law ordinances at the national level have failed.

Conclusion

This paper has explained the conditions under which Islamist candidates make moderate appeals rather than exclusively Islamic appeals. We demonstrate that party ideology, demographics, urban-rural differences, and the level of government drive candidate's appeals. Rather than being static or only moderating, we find that candidates respond to their constituencies. Islamic parties are not uniform or teleological by nature but, like other political parties, respond to the specific political and social contexts in which they operate. Non-Muslim, rural, and national constituencies increase moderation in election campaigns.

This paper also differentiates the ways in which contexts shape Islamists and Muslim democrats. Demographic factors have the most substantial effects, but the presence of non-Muslim constituents influences the behavior of Islamist and Muslim democratic candidates differently. Muslim democrats reduce Islamic appeals but maintain high levels of nationalist appeals; Islamists increase nationalist appeals but maintain high levels of Islamic appeals. This

surprising finding suggests that Islamic parties moderate by varying appeals related to a secondary party identity rather than their core party identity.

Whereas many studies of campaigns have relied on party manifestos and platforms as evidence, this study highlights the usefulness of election posters—a widely available, replicable, and transparent source of campaign appeals. Election posters also offer an advantage of mapping candidate behavior on the ground and among the masses, whereas party manifestos often reflect only the preferences of the party leaders and may not be disseminated to the masses. As a result, we believe that campaign posters, which are particularly prominent in developing countries, offer a gold mine for scholarship on political behavior.

Although our poster data come from a single country, the findings should be applicable beyond Indonesia. Our key variables (such as party ideology and the percentage of Muslims in the population) are not particular to Indonesia and are likely to affect the behavior of Islamic candidates elsewhere in similar ways. Furthermore, the study of moderation should not be limited to Islamic parties. Party moderation and immoderation is a key issue for the Indian People's Party (Bharatiya Janata Party), the Republican Party in the United States, the Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland), Kōmeitō in Japan, and in any policy setting where anti-system parties are integrated into democratic institutions.

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
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Table 1. Candidate Poster Campaigns (OLS)

	Moderation			Immoderation		
	% candidate posters with nationalist appeals			% candidate posters with Islamic appeals		
	All candidates (1)	Muslim democrats (2)	Islamists (3)	All candidates (4)	Muslim democrats (5)	Islamists (6)
Islamic party candidate (1/0)	-0.064^			0.108**		
	(0.037)			(0.035)		
Muslim population (%)	-0.327**	-0.136	-0.535**	0.232**	0.404**	0.049
	(0.099)	(0.139)	(0.138)	(0.084)	(0.101)	(0.127)
Modern sector GRDP (%)	-0.319*	-0.213	-0.410*	0.291*	0.133	0.413*
	(0.125)	(0.188)	(0.166)	(0.116)	(0.166)	(0.161)
Regional legislature (1/0)	-0.025	0.061	-0.134	0.120*	0.137^	0.102
	(0.057)	(0.082)	(0.081)	(0.054)	(0.075)	(0.078)
Female candidate (1/0)	-0.007	0.016	-0.033	0.591**	0.573**	0.595**
	(0.045)	(0.068)	(0.058)	(0.030)	(0.048)	(0.035)
Population (logged)	0.076**	0.070^	0.075**	0.032	0.053	0.016
	(0.023)	(0.039)	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.038)	(0.037)
Intercept	-0.138	-0.374	0.163	-0.694^	-1.005*	-0.289
	(0.348)	(0.546)	(0.437)	(0.362)	(0.505)	(0.516)
N	570	287	283	570	287	283
R Squared	0.06	0.01	0.13	0.29	0.31	0.28

Note: This table presents the results of regression analyses for independent variables (rows) and dependent variables (columns). Entries are coefficients from the OLS regression model. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
$^p < 0.10$; $*p < 0.05$; $**p < 0.01$.

Figure 1. Model of how pressures from above and below affect candidates' moderation or immoderation behavior.

Moderation
Nationalist appeals

Immoderation
Islamic appeals

(y-axis: % of candidate's posters; values 0, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60)

(x-axis categories: Muslim democrat, Islamist | Muslim democrat, Islamist)

Party Ideology

Figure 2. Predicted probabilities of moderation and immoderation in candidates' poster campaigns by party type. Data for this chart were computed using MARGINS in Stata 14, referencing regression model 1 (for moderation) and model 4 (for immoderation) in Table 1. Probabilities were calculated while holding all other independent and control variables at their mean. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

Figure 3. Moderation and immoderation by political party type. The size of the circles indicates the percentage of the vote for the national legislature for each political party. The number of candidates is in parentheses for each party as follows: national Muslim democratic parties: PAN (177), PKB (75), PKNU (35); national Islamic parties: PBB (57), PBR (27), PKS (94), PPP (86); regional Islamic parties, which are combined: PAAS (5), PBA (7), PDA (4). We excluded PKNUI from this chart as it only had 3 candidates.

Figure 4. Election posters from PKNU, PAN, and PKS.

1. Minority to majority Muslim population constituencies

1a. Moderation (Nationalist appeals)

1b. Immoderation (Islamic appeals)

Muslim population (%)

2. Rural to urban constituencies

2a. Moderation (Nationalist appeals)

2b. Immoderation (Islamic appeals)

District type (GRDP from modern sectors (%))

3. National and regional constituencies

3a. Moderation (Nationalist appeals)

3b. Immoderation (Islamic appeals)

Legislative elections

— All candidates — Muslim democrats - - Islamists

Figure 5. Predicted probabilities of moderation and immoderation in candidates' poster campaigns. As in Figure 2, the data were computed using MARGINS in Stata 14.

Figure 6. Moderation and immoderation by candidates with different constituencies.

Endnotes

[1] PKS was initially the "Justice Party" (*Partai Keadilan*) but failed to meet the 2% threshold in the 1998 election. It was renamed the Prosperous Justice Party and met the threshold in the 2004 election.

[2] The development of regional parties in other provinces is prevented because all parties outside Aceh must maintain party branches around the country.

[3] Overall, Indonesia's population is 88% Muslim. Christians (Catholics and Protestants) constitute 9.8% of the population, and there are smaller numbers of Buddhists, Hindus, and Confucians (National Census 2010).

[4] They included a network of researchers working for an Indonesian NGO, SurveyMETER, and a personal network of research colleagues.

[5] To the best of our knowledge, no study has ever collected a truly random sample of election posters. In Indonesia, this would be particularly difficult given the short campaign period, the thousands of candidates, and the vastness of the country, which consists of islands stretching across an expanse of over 4,000 miles.

[6] Working from a detailed codebook, one author coded all the visual elements. Through experimentation, we found that the most reliable method was to code one element at a time for each poster, doing multiple passes until all elements were coded. As a reliability check, an Indonesian research assistant coded 150 posters (20% of the dataset) for Islamic and nationalist elements. These visual elements were generally clear and obvious. As expected, inter-coder reliability scores were high. To code the text, first all poster text was transcribed into fields. Next, we analyzed all the words used and made word dictionaries for all words relating to Islam and nationalism. From these word lists, we generated codes indicating whether each poster contained textual references to Islam or nationalism. A detailed codebook is included in the appendix.

[7] For example, the legislative district in Kota Bandung, the capital of West Java, had a modern sector GRDP of 99.7%, indicating that it is highly urban. In contrast, Kabupaten Mamasa in West Sulawesi had a modern sector GRDP of 47%, indicating its primarily rural nature. Data came from the *Financial Statistics of Regencies and Municipalities*, 2008–2009.

Supplementary Materials

Descriptive and summary statistics, alternative models, and supplementary figures

Contents

Descriptive Statistics

Table A1. Distribution of posters, candidates, and electoral districts by province

Province name	Province number	# Posters	# Candidates	District (DPRD)	Province (DPRD)	National (DPD-RI)	All
				# Electoral districts in the province with posters			
Aceh	1100	85	70	1	1	1	3
Sumatera Utara	1200	8	6	1	1	1	3
Lampung	1800	94	69	3	3	1	7
Jakarta	3100	64	46	0	5	3	8
Jawa Barat	3200	125	78	3	2	2	7
Jawa Tengah	3300	183	131	3	2	3	8
Yogyakarta	3400	90	74	4	4	1	9
Nusa Tenggara Timur	5300	17	16	1	1	1	3
Kalimantan Selatan	6300	21	18	1	1	1	3
Sulawesi Selatan	7300	11	10	1	1	1	3
Sulawesi Barat	7600	8	6	1	2	1	4
Maluku	8100	24	21	2	1	1	4
Papua Barat	9100	26	25	1	1	1	3
Total		**756**	**570**	**22**	**25**	**18**	**65**

Table A2. Distribution of posters, candidates, and electoral districts by party

Party Name	Islamic nature	Regional/ National	Party Number	# Posters	# Candidates	# Electoral districts with posters from each party			
						District (DPRD)	Province (DPRD)	National (DPD-RI)	All
PAAS	Islamic	Regional	2	5	5	1	1	0	2
PBA	Islamic	Regional	3	8	7	1	1	0	2
PDA	Islamic	Regional	4	7	4	1	0	0	1
PPNUI	Islamic	National	19	3	3	2	1	0	3
PAN	Moderate	National	24	242	177	20	19	18	57
PBB	Islamic	National	25	70	57	12	8	10	30
PBR	Islamic	National	27	36	27	6	7	4	17
PKB	Moderate	National	34	89	75	15	12	8	35
PKNU	Moderate	National	36	51	35	9	9	7	25
PKS	Islamic	National	38	124	94	15	14	10	39
PPP	Islamic	National	41	121	86	13	12	9	34
		Total	**253**	**756**	**570**	**95**	**84**	**66**	**245**

Full names of regional Acehnese parties: Partai Aceh Aman Seujahtera (PAAS); Partai Bersatu Atjeh (PBA); Partai Daulat Atjeh (PDA). Full names of national parties: Partai Persatuan Nahdlatul Ummah Indonesia (PPNUI); Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN); Partai Bulan Bintang (PBB); Partai Bintang Reformasi (PBR); Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB); Partai Kebangkitan Nasional Ulama (PKNU); Partai Kedadilan Sejahtera (PKS); Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP).

Summary Statistics

Unit of analysis = Candidate

Table A3. Summary statistics for dependent variables (UOA = Candidate)

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Nationalist poster campaign (%)	570	0.317	0.447	0	1
Islamist poster campaign (%)	570	0.475	0.490	0	1

Table A4. Summary statistics for independent variables (UOA = Candidate)

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Islamic party candidate (1/0)	570	0.496	0.500	0.00	1.00
Muslim population (%)	570	0.864	0.213	0.05	0.99
Modern sector GRDP (%)	570	0.839	0.150	0.44	1.00
Regional legislature (1/0)	570	0.796	0.403	0.00	1.00
Female candidate (1/0)	570	0.218	0.413	0.00	1.00
Population (logged)	570	13.877	0.919	11.85	15.36

Table A5. Correlation matrix for independent variables (UOA = Candidate)

	Islamic party candidate (1/0)	Muslim population (%)	Modern sector GRDP (%)	Regional legislature (1/0)	Female candidate (1/0)	Population (logged)
Islamic party candidate (1/0)	1.000					
Muslim population (%)	0.005	1.000				
Modern sector GRDP (%)	0.031	-0.021	1.000			
Regional legislature (1/0)	0.031	0.010	0.121	1.000		
Female candidate (1/0)	0.002	0.024	-0.077	0.014	1.000	
Population (logged)	-0.075	0.318	0.027	-0.528	0.041	1.000

Regression Tables

Unit of analysis = Candidate

Table A6. Candidate Poster Campaigns
Tobit Model. Lower limit (ie. left-censoring) set to 0; upper limit (ie. right-censoring) set to 1 for each DV.

	Moderation % candidate posters with nationalist appeals			**Immoderation** % candidate posters with Islamic appeals		
	All candidates (1)	Muslim democrats (2)	Islamists (3)	All candidates (4)	Muslim democrats (5)	Islamists (6)
Islamic party candidate (1/0)	-0.946^			0.216**		
	(0.512)			(0.070)		
Muslim population (%)	-4.729**	-1.671	-8.988**	0.552**	14.641*	1.268
	(1.512)	(1.695)	(2.996)	(0.200)	(5.763)	(2.953)
Modern sector GRDP (%)	-4.575*	-2.385	-7.552*	0.590*	4.105	8.718^
	(1.786)	(2.194)	(3.105)	(0.236)	(4.396)	(4.593)
Regional legislature (1/0)	-0.070	0.795	-1.319	0.242*	3.050	2.222
	(0.720)	(0.916)	(1.183)	(0.110)	(2.090)	(1.932)
Female candidate (1/0)	-0.098	0.223	-0.563	0.967**	13.700**	17.726**
	(0.606)	(0.760)	(0.982)	(0.059)	(4.337)	(6.137)
Population (logged)	1.285**	0.917^	1.762*	0.066	1.167	0.256
	(0.404)	(0.496)	(0.731)	(0.050)	(0.998)	(0.785)
Intercept	-11.182*	-11.110^	-11.821	-2.238**	-38.820*	-15.140
	(5.260)	(6.692)	(8.594)	(0.708)	(18.265)	(12.389)
N	570	287	283	570	287	283

Note: Results of regression analyses for independent variables (rows) and dependent variables (columns). Entries are coefficients from the TOBIT regression model. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
^$p < 0.10$; *$p < 0.05$; **$p < 0.01$.

Table A7. Candidate Poster Campaigns

Logit Model: DV = 1 if Nationalist (or Islamic) appeals are 50% or more of candidate's posters.

	Moderation % candidate posters with nationalist appeals			Immoderation % candidate posters with Islamic appeals		
	All candidates (1)	Muslim democrats (2)	Islamists (3)	All candidates (4)	Muslim democrats (5)	Islamists (6)
Islamic party candidate (1/0)	-0.355^			0.600**		
	(0.181)			(0.198)		
Muslim population (%)	-1.498**	-0.512	-2.796**	1.546*	3.731**	0.265
	(0.484)	(0.612)	(0.749)	(0.605)	(1.066)	(0.714)
Modern sector GRDP (%)	-1.469*	-0.781	-2.315*	1.802**	1.287	2.177*
	(0.620)	(0.844)	(0.947)	(0.691)	(1.005)	(0.942)
Regional legislature (1/0)	-0.023	0.360	-0.487	0.697*	0.736^	0.642
	(0.268)	(0.364)	(0.414)	(0.306)	(0.429)	(0.440)
Female candidate (1/0)	-0.087	0.039	-0.253	3.619**	3.229**	
	(0.222)	(0.304)	(0.339)	(0.382)	(0.493)	
Population (logged)	0.512**	0.454*	0.603**	0.182	0.343^	0.087
	(0.137)	(0.190)	(0.212)	(0.133)	(0.208)	(0.177)
Intercept	-5.008**	-5.941*	-4.446	-6.825**	-10.605**	-4.103
	(1.846)	(2.570)	(2.785)	(1.992)	(3.255)	(2.618)
N	570	287	283	570	287	221
Pseudo R2	0.05	0.02	0.10	0.24	0.25	0.03
Log Likelihood	-353.02	-189.84	-156.45	-302.06	-146.81	-145.99

Note: Results of regression analyses for independent variables (rows) and dependent variables (columns). Entries are coefficients from the LOGIT regression model. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

^$p < 0.10$; *$p < 0.05$; **$p < 0.01$.

Summary Statistics

Unit of analysis = Poster

Table A8. Summary statistics for dependent variables (UOA = Poster)

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Nationalist poster (1/0)	756	0.325	0.469	0	1
Islamist poster (1/0)	756	0.471	0.499	0	1

Table A9. Summary statistics for independent variables (UOA = Poster)

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Islamic party candidate (1/0)	756	0.495	0.500	0.00	1.00
Muslim population (%)	756	0.877	0.195	0.05	0.99
Modern sector GRDP (%)	756	0.842	0.152	0.44	1.00
Regional legislature (1/0)	756	0.774	0.419	0.00	1.00
Female candidate (1/0)	756	0.208	0.406	0.00	1.00
Population (logged)	756	13.963	0.903	11.85	15.36

Table A10. Correlation matrix for independent variables (UOA = Poster)

|	Islamic party candidate (1/0)	Muslim population (%)	Modern sector GRDP (%)	Regional legislature (1/0)	Female candidate (1/0)	Population (logged)
Islamic party candidate (1/0)	1.000					
Muslim population (%)	-0.013	1.000				
Modern sector GRDP (%)	0.036	-0.049	1.000			
Regional legislature (1/0)	0.042	0.012	0.072	1.000		
Female candidate (1/0)	0.002	-0.004	-0.048	0.012	1.000	
Population (logged)	-0.110	0.292	0.079	-0.540	0.036	1.000

Regression Table

Unit of analysis = Poster

Table A11. Candidate Poster Campaigns (OLS)

OLS Model. Uses an election poster as the unit of analysis (N = 756)

	Moderation % candidate posters with nationalist appeals			**Immoderation** % candidate posters with Islamic appeals		
	All candidates (1)	Muslim democrats (2)	Islamists (3)	All candidates (4)	Muslim democrats (5)	Islamists (6)
Islamic party candidate (1/0)	-0.039 (0.034)			0.084** (0.031)		
Muslim population (%)	-0.323** (0.095)	-0.143 (0.134)	-0.508** (0.133)	0.238** (0.081)	0.409** (0.100)	0.068 (0.121)
Modern sector GRDP (%)	-0.276* (0.113)	-0.183 (0.166)	-0.379* (0.155)	0.301** (0.104)	0.123 (0.150)	0.447** (0.143)
Regional legislature (1/0)	-0.006 (0.051)	0.094 (0.070)	-0.138^ (0.074)	0.117* (0.046)	0.092 (0.065)	0.153* (0.066)
Female candidate (1/0)	-0.028 (0.041)	0.003 (0.062)	-0.069 (0.053)	0.599** (0.026)	0.586** (0.041)	0.599** (0.033)
Population (logged)	0.079** (0.022)	0.083* (0.035)	0.064* (0.027)	0.010 (0.024)	0.036 (0.035)	-0.009 (0.034)
Intercept	-0.226 (0.326)	-0.612 (0.488)	0.293 (0.427)	-0.392 (0.333)	-0.738 (0.461)	-0.043 (0.474)
N	756	382	374	756	382	374
R Squared	0.04	0.01	0.10	0.27	0.28	0.27

Note: Results of regression analyses for independent variables (rows) and dependent variables (columns). Entries are coefficients from the OLS regression model. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
$^\wedge p < 0.10$; $*p < 0.05$; $**p < 0.01$.

Figures

Figure A1. Moderation and immoderation by national and regional Islamist parties competing in Aceh only. These posters were photographed in Aceh's capital, Banda Aceh, which is located on the northern tip of Sumatra. The city is homogeneously Islamic (96%) and the majority is indigenously Acehnese (86%).